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ABSTRACT:In this paper, the relation of concentration to profit rates
is examined with the help of new data for a sample of 507 manufactur-
ing firms. Specifically, these data makeitpossible to distinguish
between specialized and diversified firms. For the latter,measures of
concentration relate to the entire range of a firm's activities rather than
merely to its primary activity. ¶ Using severalmeasures of the profit
rate, the results obtained consistently show that thereis no clear
single-variate relation between concentration and the level of profits.
Indeed, the industry in which the firm operates exerts onlya weak
influence on the differences in profit rates among firms. However, the
profitrates of firms in the more concentrated industries show a
substantially higher serial correlation. The latter result is attributed to
high exit as well as entry barriers in the concentrated industries.
Economic theory offers a clear-cut solution for the relation of profits to
monopoly power only for the polar cases of single-firm monopoly and
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perfe(:tcompetition.Rutacontinuous relation between profits and
nionopoly power has been widely assumed in economic Iteralure, with
ifldeXCS of concentration a commonly used proxy for monopolypower.
There have now been well over thirty empirical studies thatfocus directly
on that relation.' Al) but a few have been based on aggregative datafor
industries, thatis, data that pertain only to industryaverages (whether
compiled from published aggregates or from individualfirm records).
Almost all support the conclusion, though with results thatvary greatly in
strength, that the association between profits andconcentration is positive,2
A serious problem in the analysis ofaverage profit rates for industriesas
distinct from information on profitsfor individual firmsisthe strong
association of profit rates with firm size. While there issome uncertainty
about the extent to which the relationstems from mere accounting
pe(:uliarities as distinct from real differencesin profitability, thereappears
to be little doubt about the existence ofa statistical association. Since small
firms are, generally, farmore numerous in the low-concentration indus-
tries, the net relation between profits andconcentration becomes difficult
to identify with such data. Moreover, thereare serious aggregation prob-
lems. Thus, for example,average profit rates of surviving firmsmay be
equal across industries. However, observedaverages may vary considerably
because of the effecton the averages of failing firms,particularly in
industries with high rates ofentry by new firms. For this and stillother
reasons, microdata are clearly superior in testingthe relation of profitsto
Concentration.
Since hardly a monthpasses in which some new study of profitrates
does not emerge, any listis likely to be incomplete bypublication time.
However, there have bcenat least three important publishedstudies
containing analyses of rnicrodata.The most recent with whichwe are familiar relates onlyto the food industries and thereforeyields conclusions of limited generality.Hall and Weiss,in one of the two otherstudies, found a weak butstatistically significant relationbetween profits and
concentration in the context ofa multivariate model. The third is theearly study of Bain,6 which foundfor large firms in1936-1940, a strong relation
between profit rates andconcentration when firmswere grouped into two
categories: those classified inindustries with eight-firmconcentration ratios of 70 percentor more and those with ratiosbelow 70 percent.
The relevance ofBain's study asa test of the equilibrium relation
between the twovariables may be questionedbecause of the choice of period. The interval1936-1940 was stronglyinfluenced by cyclical forces, arid Bain's resultmay largely reflect the differingcyclical sensitivity of various industries. On theother hand, thestrength of the relationmay have been understatedbecause Bain's dataobliged him to classify firmsexclu- sively byconcentration in a firm's primaryindustry, regardless of levelof specialization.
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There are several versions of the hypothesison ihe relation of profits to
concentration. In its strong form, concentration is a dominant variab!e, and
its effects should be observable in a single-variate relation, given suitable
data. inits weak form, concentration merely contributes to explaining
profit rates. The effects of concentration, in this version, need not be
observable except in the context of either a multivariate additive modelor,
alternatively, a model that captures the interactions between concentration
and other variables.
In this paper we test only the strong form of the hypothesis. The policy
implications of the two forms are, of course, quite different. It is one thing
to say that concentrated industries have higher profits than unconcentrated
ones, and quite another to assert that concentrated industries, though no
more profitable than other industries, would, in the absence of concentra-
tion, have been less profitable still. Or, alternatively, if the principal effects
of concentration arise from interactions, itis particular configurations of
variables that become relevant for policy rather than concentration by
itself. Thus, though the way in which the scope of this paper has been
delimited leaves many questions unanswered, the issue of what the simple
relation is between profits and concentration is far from trivial and has
broad implications for policy.
An examination of this basic question seems particularly appropriate at
this time because new data recently developed permit the use of new
techniques of analysis. rhese data, which are for 507 manufacturing
companies and are described in detail in Appendix A, consist of company
financial information, from Cornpustat, and information on the employ-
ment of establishments and the industries in which the establishments were
classified.
The measurçs of profit rates allrelate to accounting profits. This is
consistent with the procedure followed in all other published studies of
profit rates and, indeed, is probably the only feasible alternative at this
juncture. Not only are price indexes for deflating assets7 and depreciation
unsatisfactory, but little is known about the effect of technological change
on replacement costs. Itis possible that even a random measurement error
inthe approximation of "true" profits through accounting data may
obscure a weak relation of concentration to profits. But there is no basis for
assuming a systematic bias such as would arise in inflationary times if firms
in concentrated industries had, on the average, assets with a shorter
economic life than firms in other industries.If the latter had been true,
firms in concentrated industries would have had reported profits under-
stated relative to those of other firms. But there is no evidence to support a
conclusion that such a bias exists.
Since our data relate to the 1 960s, they are less vulnerable than those of
some earlier studies inasmuch as pre-World War II assets had a relatively
small book value by the early 1960s. Hence, the denominators of our$
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rate-of-return ratios do not straddle periods of vastly differingprice levels.
Some distortion in the measure of profit rates is probablypresent because
of the standard accounting practice of expensing investment inintangibles.
While little is known about the magnitude of the resultingmeasurement
error, expenditures on intangibles (e.g., advertising and research andde-
velopment) are likely to be larger for firms in the concentratedindustries.
Hence, if there is a significant distortion, it is likely to biasthe results in
favor of a hypothesis that a significant relation exists betweenconcentra-
tion and profit rates, since the effect of expensing intangiblesis generally to
overstate profit rates.
The forces generating differences in profit ratesamong firms may be
decomposed into three sets. Withydefined as the profit rate of the ith
firm in the jth industry, we have
(1)y, =+ +th.iVk + YkiWki
where the x's refer to the relevant attributes of industriesand markets; the
v's.to the relatively stable characteristics of firms (e.g., firmsize or
organizational structure); and the w's, to the transitory forcesthat affect the
fortunes of individual firms and which, for lack of information,are usually
lumped together as random disturbances(e.g., labor disputes, natural
catastrophes, managerial errors, etc.). Theanalysis first focuses on thex
attributes.
THE INDUSTRY AND THEMARKET AS EXPLANATIONS
OF PROFIT RATES
Do the profit rates of firmscluster around industrymeans? The belief that
they do derives fromtwo assumptions. First, thestructure of competition
varies greatly among markets;hence, the firm's industryis an important variable in explaining relativeprofit rates. Second, adjustmentsto shifts in market demandor inindustry productioncosts are slow enough to
generate sustained disequilibrium5in the profit rates of allfirms in an industry. As a test of theseassumptions, we proceeded totest the null hypothesis of equality ofindustry profit rates.
The basic model underlyingthe test of equality ofindustry profit rates (defined as the simplearithmetic means of theprofit rates of firms classified in the industry) isa one-way analysis ofvariance. Symbolically, the model can be written as
(2)yp + /3-I- 11.....I; j1 .....where yis the profit rate of the jth firm in the ith industry, 13 is a constant
associated with the ith industry, and u15 is a random disturbance which can
be attributed to, among other things, the omitted firm and industry vari-
ables. We assume that uis normally and independently distributed with
mean 0 and variance o.
The conditional expectation of y for any industry is given by p. + /3; so a
test of equality of industry profit rates (that is, of the irrelevance of industry
classification) may he formulated as
(3)131-132 ..."f3,=O
It can easily be seen that analysis of variance is appropriate and that the F
ratio gives us the relevant test of the null hypothesis in equation 3.
Table 1shows the unadjusted coefficients of determination (R2) ex-
pressed as percentage ratios of between-industry variance to total variance
and the corresponding F values for various measures of profit rates, for
three- and for five-year averages, at three-digit and four-digit levels of
industry detail; the statistics are shown both for specialized firms in the
sample, i.e., those with specialization ratios of 0.5 or more in the primary
industry, and for all firms in the sample in the relevant industries. While the
samples per industry were small, the method of analysis pools the data for
all industries so that the coefficients of determination are all based on large
samples (the smallest having 121 firms). Since sample sizes and numbers of
industries varied, comparisons among statistics, levels of industry detail,
and sample types require adjustment of the coefficients of determination
for degrees of freedom. Following the usual notation,
- )2
R2 -
and the adjusted coefficient
(1R2) flI
- 1 -)2/fr - I)
- -)2/(n - 1)
Several conclusions emerge.First,the coefficients of determination
clearly indicate that the industry of a firm is not a dominant variable in
determining profit rate levels. Except for the profits-to-sales ratio, which is
influenced by lirge iriterindustry differences in factor proportions, at least
some of the F values for each statistic are nonsignificant.
Even more striking is the fact that the proportion of the total variance
explained by industry means does not rise as the level of industry detail
increases. The presumed greater homogeneity of four-digit as compared








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coefficients of determination. Similarly, when data are limited to firmswith
specialization ratios of 0.5 or more iii the primary industry, the resultsare,
in general, no different from those based on the entire sample of firms.This
was also true when data were limited to firms with specialization ratiosof
0.7 and 0.9, though the latter results are not shown in Table 1. Allthese
results reinforce the conclusion that the role of industry andmarket
characteristics in determining the level of profit rates is relativelyweak, on
the average, as compared to the role of variables thatpertain to individual
firms.
Though, frankly, we found the results surprising, it mightbe argued that
most of thc industry categories probably did not differ greatly withrespect
to market structure. Moreover, the period chosen, 1966-1970,was gener-
ally one of high, that is, equilibrium, levels ofoutput. Hence, variations in
the sensitivity of industries to cyclical fluctuationshad little influenceon
our results. What conclusions would emerge (industrieswere segregated
so as to take account of basic differences in market structure?In the next
section we examine this question.
CONCENTRATION AND PROFIT RATES
We are now ready to examine directlythe single-variate relation between
concentration and profit rates. FollowingBain's approach,we examine
several dichotomous relations, thatis, the distinction between firmsin high- and low-concentrationindustries is madeon the basis of several
alternative boundaries withrespecttothe concentrationratio.This
procedure__as contrasted with testingof a continuous relation betweenthe
variables__is followed becauseBain argued (withsome merit) that a fairly high concentrationratio is required beforea positive effect on profit rates
can be expected. Both he and otherauthorso reported higher profitrates for concentratedindustriesonly whenconcentration exceededahigh threshold.
Table 2 shows the relationof average profitrates to concentration in
three ways. First, theaverage profit rates are shown for firmsgrouped, on the basis of primaryactivity, into industries with1967 eight-firm concentra- tion ratios ofmore and less than 70percent (columns I and 2). Second, the results are shownwith a grouping of firmsbased on whetherconcentra- tion ratioswere more or less than 50percent (columns 3 and 4). Third, firms are dividedinto twogroups (upper 20 percent andlower 80 per- cent) on the basis ofweighted concentrationratios (columns 5 and 6), that s, the concentration ratio foreach four-digit industryin which the firm is





the importance of largefirms in many industries characterizedby high
serious problem for tests of hypotheseson market concentration because of
the potential error fora given industry will depend, in part,on the size
distribution of firms in that industry.Without correction, this introducesa
error of attributing all the income ofa firm to a single industry. Since
product diversification isconsiderably greater for large than for smallfirms,
ment located in that industry. Thepurpose of weighting is to correct for the
active is weighted by theproportion of the firm's manufacturing employ-
In brief, the differences inprofit rates between firms with activitiesin
more and less concentrated industrieswere sniall for all measures of
concentration and proft rate,9 and for boththree-year and five-year
intervals in the 1966-1970 period. Theresults were substantially thesame
when annual datawere examined, though those are not shown in Table2.
For the classification of firmson the basis of primary industry, the high-
concentration categories had the loweraverage profit rates in most cases,
but the differenceswere very small, and none of the F valueswas
significant at the 0.05 level.For the weighted concentration ratios, the
high-concentration categories showed thehigher profit rates in mostcases;
but, again, the F valueswere nonsignificant at the 0.05 level.
Turning once again to the classificationof firms according to concentra-
tion on the basis of primary industry,we see the striking fact that relative
profit rates for high- andlow-concentration categories were substantially
the same whetheror not the sample was limited to the specialized firms
(those with primary industryspecialization ratios of 0.5or more). This
result reinforces our conclusion thatthe relation of profit rate levelto
Concentration was not simply concealed by thephenomenon of product
diversification.
The results lend themselvesto several interpretations. One interpretation
is that in a society in which explicitcollusion is effectively blocked by
antitrust laws, even high concentrationis consistent with the existence of
sufficient rivalry to force profitrates to competitive levels. In short,con-
centrationis an inadequate index of monopolypower. An alternative
interpretation is that the returns fromnoncompetitive prices are either
dissipated through wasteor appropriated by factor inputs other than capital
(i.e., labor).
Still a third alternative is thatcomparisons of profit rates are misleading
unless the profit ratesare adlusted for differencesinrisk. While the
introduction of variables that capture riskmight help reveal some net
relation between concentration andprofitability, within the framework of
the "strong" hypothesis (as statedearlier) the issue can be putmore
bluntly. Specifically,is there evidence of systematicallylower risks for


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 Michael Gort and RaoSingarnsenj
reflect higher rates ofreturn per "unit of risk" in thehigh-concentr0 industries?
While several studies showa relation between the variancein prf rates and firm size or the firm'smarket share,'° no firmevidence exis(5o the relation betweenmeasures of risk and marketconcentrationIf risk is measured by the interfirm variancein profit rates, the firms inour sample that were in the top20 percent basedon weighted concentration
ratios showed a somewhat higherstandard deviation in profitrates than therest of the sample. Thiswas true for seven out oftenyears in the 1961i970 period if profit ratesare measuid by the ratio ofnet income plus fixed charges to total assets,though the differences instandard deviationswere generally quite small.
THE STABILIry OFVARIATIONS IN PROFITRATES
Let us turn onceagain to equation 1. Ifone groups companies byindustry and the samplesare sufficiently large, the w'sshould tend toyield zero sums, leaving the x's and they'sas sources of variation inprofit rates (since there is noreason to assume that the v'salso sum tozero when firms are grouped by industry).Since the w'sare, by definition, transitory,greater serial correlation shouldbe expected inprofit rates for industryaverages than for individualfirms.
A key question is therate at which serialcorrelation arising fromthe x and v variables declinesover time. Withrespect to market forces, theissue is aptly stated byStigler:
Competitive industrieswill have a volatilepattern of rates ofreturn, for the movements into high-profit
industries and out oflow-profit industrieswill together with the flowof new disturbancesof equilibrium_ to a constantly changing hierarchyof rates of return.In the monopolistic
industries, on the other hand, the unusually
profitable industries willbe able topreserve their preferential position forconsiderable periods oftime."
In short, do thex variables identify
differences among industries or merelydisequiIibr5iIndeed, are deviationsfrom the norm of thecompetitive structure ofmarkets themselvesexamples of disequilib riums?
Substantially thesame issues arisewhen we lookat the v variables. If some form of businessorganjzai0production technique,or set of labor skills leadsto superior profitperformance willit be rapidlyimitated and acquired bycompeting firms? Orare there specialized
resources, human or physical, thatcannot be readilyacquired by otherfirms? Anecdotalevi-Concentration and Profit Rates 13
derice can be cited for both types of phenomena, and the issue remains to
be resolved empirically.
Table 3 shows the regression coefficients computed for eachmatrix of
serial correlations for the relevant samples of firms or industriesfor profit
rates in the 1961-1970 period. A matrix of serialcorrelations was com-
puted for each of two measures of profits, for each of varioussamples of
firms, and for both individual firm data and groupings of firmsby primary
industry. Thus, for each matrix (for example, the matrix forthe ratio of
operating income to total assets for all firms with aspecialization ratio of
more than 0.5), there are nine serialcorrelations between profit rates in
two adjacent years, eight for profit rates two yearsapart, and so forth.
Appendix Table B-i shows, for illustrative purposes, thecorrelation of
1961 profit rates with those for each of the ninesucceeding years and of
1970 profit rates with those for each of the ninepreceding years. Table 3,
then, measures the rate of decline in serial correlation as the timeelapsed
increases (thus providing answers to questions such as, Howmuch lower is
the correlation of 1960 and 1962 profit rates than of 1960and 1961 or
1961 and 1962 profit rates?). The correlations foreach set of intervals, for
example, all correlations for profit rates two years apart, are notaveraged.
Each correlation coefficientis a separate observation for purposesof
computing the regression coefficients.
Comparing first the serial correlation coefficients12 withthose obtained
by Stigler13 we find that (1) even for ungrouped data, that is,for the sample
of individual firms, the coefficients we computed declined moreslowly
than Stigler's estimates for the unconcentrated industries;and (2) our
estimates for three-digit industry groupings, without reference to concentra-
tion, showed a rate of decline in correlation coefficientsroughly compara-
ble to Stigler's for the high-concentration categoryof industries. In sum,
Stigler found substantially less stability than we did, probablybecause the
industry averages he used, particularly for theunconcentrated category,
were strongly influenced by the instability inthe profit rates of small firms.
We can next compare the regression coefficients inTable 3 as we shift
from samples of firms limited to those with 0.5specialization (columns 3
and 6) to the entire sample of firms but limited tothe same industries
(columns 4 and 7). For ungrouped data, the two typesof samples yield
roughly the same regression coefficients. As we shift toserial correlations
for industry groupings, however, the reduction in random varianceunveils
a statistically significant differencein coefficients. The samples of more
homogeneous companies in terms of product structure(those limited to
firms with a specialization ratio of at least 0.5) yield a morestable pattern
of profit rates with substantially lower rates of decline inserial correlation.
This, in turn, reflects the role of the x variables in equation 1.That is,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)tics that are more distinctive and consistentover timehence the greater
stability of cross-sectional differences in profitrates.
We are now ready to examine the relation ofcross-sectional stability in
relative profit rates to concentration (Table4).In general, our results
confirm Stigler's findings. Theupper 20 percent of firms in terms of
weightedconcentrationratiosyieldeddistinctlylowerregression
coefficients (that is. rates of decline in ther's) than therest of the sample. In
addition, and consistent with that result, theregression coefficient was
reduced when the sample for the high-concentrationcategory was limited
to specialized firms. The effect of limiting the sampleto specialized firms
was opposite for the low-concentration category. In short, for the low-
concentration category, product diversification, by reducing therandom or
cyclical variance in profit rates, increases the stabilityof relative profit
rates.In contrast, for the high-concentrationcategory, the loss in the
distinctiveness of market characteristics that resultsfrom greater product
diversification has a negative effecton cross-sectional stability. This nega-
tive effect is greater than the positive effect of theaveraging of random and
cyclical disturbances associated with particular markets.
TABLE 4Rates of Decline in the Serial Correlation of
Profit Rates for Firms in High-Concentration and
in All Other Industriesa
SOURCE:See accompanying text.
a Rates of decline over time are measured by regression coefficients computed for thematrix
of serial correlation coefficients for the period 1961-1970. Range of sample size is indicated
in parentheses below the regression coefficients. Sample size varies depending upon which
two years were correlated.
Each firm's concentration was computed by weighting the eight-firm concentration ratio
for each manufacturing industry in which the firm had activities by the proportion of the
firm's manufacturing employment located in establishments classified in the industry.
Weighted Concentration Ratio
Upper 20 Percent Lower 80 Percent
of Firms of Firms
Firms Firms
with0.5 with0.5
Profit All FirmsSpecialization All FirmsSpecialization
Measure in Sampleat 4-Digit Levelin Sampleat 4-Digit Level
Income + interest/
total assets .04891 .04256 .05354 .05759
(84-95) (54-64) (333-375) t 164-197)
Operating income!
total assets .04407 .03997 .05701 .06295
(97-101) (66-70) (372-403) (194-210)
Concentration and Profit Rates 15I
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How can the strong effect of concentration on stability be reconcjl
with an apparent absence of observed effect of concentration on thelevel
of profit rates? As indicated by Stigler,it is reasonable toexpect that in
high-concentration industriesthat is,industries with Presumablyhigh
entry barrierswhen above-average profits are present they can persistfor
long periods of time. But if profits are below average in aparticular
high-concentration sector, will there not be a rapid shift ofresources to
competitive industries with higher profit rates? If so, theaverage for the
concentrated sector should generally be above that for themore competi
tive industries.
The answer to the riddle lies in the proposition thathigh-concentj0
industries are associated not only with high entry barriers, butalso with
high exit barriers. Indeed, substantially the same factorscontribute to both
Entry barriers arise largely from the possession by firms inconcentrated
industries of specialized human or physical capital thatis difficult for
others to acquire. But, conversely, the specialization ofcapital renders it
difficult to shift such capital to newuses in more profitable sectors of the
economy. If true, this would imply that while the risks of marketerosion
from competitive pressures are less inconcentrated industries, such indus.
tries are more vulnerable thanaverage to structural changes in the
economy and in the composition of demand.
APPENDIX A: THE DATA BASE
The first element inour data base was the Dun and Bradstreetestablish-
ment record (hereafter referredto as DB data) for the 1.000 largest
companies inthe United States. Thatrecord shows the number of
employees for each establishmentfor each of the 1000companies in
1970, and the primary industryof the establishment. Each ofthe com-
panies was then matched withthe identical firm in theCompustat tape for
1970. Limiting the listto companies thatwere successfully matched left us
with a sample of 884 firms.For each of the companies,employment wa
aggregated for all theestablishments and theaggregate was expressed as a ratio to total employmentfor the companyas shown in the Compustat recordThat ratiowas then used as a test of thecompleteness and reliability of information.
Our next stepwas to merge the DB recordfor the 884 firms with that obtained fromEconomic InformationSystems, Inc. (EIS). The EIS and 08 data we obtainedai'e similar in that bothshow employment for each establishment of acompany, and the establishmentsare classified by primary SIC (StandardIndustrial Classification)four-digit activity. BothS
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also have common establishment andcompany codes and an indication of
the geographic location of each plant. EIS data obtainedby us were also
for1970 and encompassed1,138 manufacturing companies, each
matched with the identical company in the Compustat record(and com-
prising virtually all manufacturing firms in the latter source). A difference
between DB and EIS information is that the latter excludes plantswith
fewer than fifty employees and those engaged in nonmanufacturingac-
tivities. Both DB and EIS data exclude central offices and foreign estab-
lishrnents of U.S. companies.
The DB and EIS lists of establishments for particular companiesare not
identical, each body of data containingsome not listed in the other. An
integrated tape was therefore developed subject to the following rules:
To the DB record for each company for which therewas also FIS
information, we added all establishments shown in the EIS but not in
the DB record.14
Companies which were only in the EIS list but not in the DB record,
and vice versa, were also included in the integrated tape. The
resulting computer tape contains data for 1,381 companies. For
each company, a ratio was computed of aggregate employment in
allits establishments to the Compustat total for thecompany as a
whole.
In selecting a test of adequacy of data, a primary objectivewas to assure
that the scope of employment data for eachcompany was consistent in
terms of establishments and industry coverage with that implicit in finan-
cial statisticsin short, that both categories of informationwere based on a
common definition of the company. Accordingly, we adopted the conser-
vative rule that inclusion in the sample drawn from the larger list required
a ratio of aggregate plant employment to company employment (the latter
as shown in Compustat) of between 0.8 and 1.2. The rule was a stringent
one since (1) our plant data excluded central office employment, and (2)
there were substantial lags in reporting changes in plant employment, with
the result that plant data and Compustat employment data did notneces-
sarily refer to the identical point in time. The sample generated byour rule
was doubtless significantly reduced by the absence from the plant record
of information on foreign establishments and by the fact that data for
nonmanufacturing activities were considerably less complete than those for
manufacturing.
The analysis reported in our paper is basedon a sample drawn as
follows: Using the limits of 0.8 and 1.2 for the ratio discussed above, 283
companies were drawn from the original list of 884 in the DB record.
Employment data for those companies were drawn exclusively from DB
.1TAB[E A-iFrequency Distribution of461 Firms by Primary
Three-Digit and Four-DigitSpecialization Ratioa
SOURCE:See accompanyingtext.
The specializationratio was defnedas employment in theprimary threeigit or four.digi industry divided bytotal companyemployment
Specialization Ratio Number of Firnis_...
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information. An additional sample of 178 companieswas drawn from the
integrated tape, subject to the same selection rule, Finally,to broaden the
sample, an additional 46 companies were included for which
qualitative
information contained in annual reports was sulficientto classify the firms
as single-industry enterprises. rhe total sample, therefore,comprised 507
firms. Table A-i contains a frequency distribution of thecompanies in the
sample. excluding the above-mentioned 46, classifiedby the primary
three-digit and four-digit specialization ratio.15 A strikingfact is thateven at
the fairly broad three-digit level, 197 of the 461 firmshad a specializai0
ratio of less than 0.5.it
TABLE B-iSerial Correlation Coefficients for Profit Rates,
1961 and succeeding Years and 1970 and
Preceding Yearsa
SOURCE:See section in text, "The Stability of Variations in Profit Rates."
Profit rates measured by the ratio of net income plus fixed charges tototal assets.
bLimited to firms with a primary three-digit specialization ratio of at least 0.5.
NOTES
For a detailed summary of studies prior to 1969, seeLeonard Weiss, "Quantitative
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